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ARTICLE 
119 
CONSISTENCY WITH COMPREHENSIVE PLANS: 
DOES MARYLAND LAW MEAN WHAT IT SAYS, OR SAY 
WHAT IT MEANS? 
Royce Hanson 
In 2008 the Maryland Court of Appeals in David Train v. Terrapin Run 
LLC1 upheld the grant of a special exception for a planned development of 
4300 homes, a 125,000 square foot shopping center, and a sewage treatment 
plant in an area the Allegany County comprehensive plan designated for 
agriculture and conservation. At issue was whether the Board of Appeals 
could approve the project in light of the Maryland Code’s definition of a 
“special exception” as:  
A grant of a specific use that would not be appropriate 
generally or without restriction and shall be based upon a 
finding that certain conditions governing special 
exceptions as detailed in the zoning ordinance exist, that 
the use conforms to the plan and is compatible with the 
existing neighborhood.2 
A closely divided court held that the statute did not require strict 
conformity with the comprehensive plan for two reasons. First, the plan was 
a guide for future development of the county, but it had no regulatory effect 
unless a statute, ordinance, or regulation required compliance with its 
recommendations. Second, the use of the term “conforms to the plan,” 
which first appeared in amendments to Article 66B in 19703 and was 
retained in 1992,4 had essentially the same meaning as the usage prior to 
that date, which required that special exceptions should be  “in harmony” 
with the plan. The court went to considerable length in supporting its 
position that various “Smart Growth” statutes had not mandated that 
counties have comprehensive plans, or if they did, the state had no power to 
enforce a conformity clause.    
1. Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 403 Md. 523 (2008).
2. Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66, § 1(k),
3. 1970 Md. Laws Ch. 672.
4. 1992 Md. Laws Ch. 437.
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Accordingly, we find nothing in the history of the 1992 legislation 
that remotely indicates that the Legislature believed that it was 
establishing that the use of the word ‘conform’ in the 1970 statute 
and as stated in Article 66B, without additional restrictive language 
which was not added, imposed any stricter standard on such land 
use decisions than the traditional ‘in harmony with’ language of the 
pre-1970 statute or our pre-and post-1970 cases meant the same 
thing. 5 
Judge Harrell, dissenting, argued that provisions of Article 66B requiring 
a finding of conformance with the comprehensive plan were not mere 
suggestions. Rather, the definition of special exception linked it to the 
comprehensive plan. He further argued that the pre-1970  “in harmony” 
standard applied not to the comprehensive land use plan, but to the zoning 
plan, an element of the comprehensive plan. 
In direct response to the Terrapin Run decision, the 2009 session of the 
General Assembly enacted the Smart Growth and Sustainable Development 
Act (SGSDA).6  The preamble to the legislation noted that while the court’s 
holding could be construed to apply only to special exceptions, the General 
Assembly was concerned that a broader interpretation could undermine the 
importance of making land use decisions “that are consistent with the 
comprehensive plan,” as required by Article 66B, § 4.09. It then expressed 
the intent of the General Assembly: 
  To encourage the development of ordinances and 
regulations that apply to locally designated priority 
funding areas and allow for mixed uses and bonus 
densities beyond those specified in the local 
comprehensive plan by excluding land uses and densities 
or intensities in the definition of ‘consistency’ for priority 
funding areas; and 
… as evidenced in Article 66B, §§ 1.03(e) and 4.09, that 
comprehensive plans should be followed as closely as 
possible while not being elevated to the status of an 
ordinance and that deviations from the plan should be 
rare.7 
5. See Trail, 403 Md. at 569-70.
6. 2009 Md. Laws Ch. 180.
7. S.B. 280, 1999 Leg. (Md. 2009) (see Preamble at 3).
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Standing alone, this artful circumlocution in the preamble of the law 
appeared to have it both ways. It encouraged higher densities and mixed 
uses in priority funding areas beyond levels specified in plans. The second 
Whereas clause, however, insisted projects follow plans “as closely as 
possible,” before softening the blow by not elevating the plan to regulatory 
status. Apart from the atmospherics surrounding adoption of the law that 
characterized it as a repudiation of the court’s decision, it would seem the 
General Assembly wanted to leave things about where they were before the 
issue went to court, making a confirming wink at the court’s droll aside in 
Terrapin Run : “We acknowledge that purpose clauses are not normally 
absolute indications of the Legislature’s intent when passing a statute.”8 
To understand what the legislature intended to do, we must look first at 
what it actually did and rely on the plain language of the statute, at least 
insofar as the language is unambiguous. This is not as simple as it sounds, 
so we shall proceed step by step. 
First, the General Assembly amended the definition of “special 
exception” to require a finding that the use “is consistent with” the plan.9 It 
then defined consistency with a comprehensive plan to mean:  
 . . . an action taken that will further, and not be contrary to, the 
following    items in the plan: 
1. policies;
2. timing of the implementation of the plan;
3. timing of development
4. timing of rezoning;
5. development patterns;
6. land uses; and
7. densities or intensities.10
In addition to the redefined special exceptions, covered actions include 
zoning, planned development, subdivision and other ordinances and 
regulations.11 Water and sewerage service areas, solid waste disposal, and 
municipal annexations required findings of plan consistency.12 That seems 
to be just about everything, and if the amendment stopped there, a plain 
8. 403 Md. at 570 n.41.
9. 2009 Md. Laws Ch. 180 § 1.00(k)
10. Ch. 180 § 1.02(c); MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1-303 (2017).
11. Ch. 180 § 1.02(a)(1); cf §§ 1.00(k), 1.04 (f), and 4.09; MD. CODE ANN., LAND 
USE § 1-301 (2017).
12. Ch. 180 §§ 1.02 (a)(2), (3) and 1.02 (b); MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1-302
(2017).
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reading of it would make it clear that projects such as Terrapin Run could 
not pass muster as furthering and not being contrary to the comprehensive 
plan. 
But the General Assembly was not through. It made an exception that 
swallowed a substantial length of the rule. Actions taken in priority funding 
areas (PFAs)--designated in plans for higher densities and given priority in 
state capital funding programs—are not required to be consistent with plans 
with regard to land uses and densities or intensities.13 Then, in 2012, the 
General Assembly enacted a clarifying amendment to the consistency rule, 
requiring charter counties to revise comprehensive plans on a 10-year cycle 
and that they:   
 shall ensure the implementation of the visions, the development 
regulations element, and the sensitive areas element of the plan.   
. . . through adoption of the following applicable implementation 
mechanisms that are consistent with the comprehensive plan: 
1. zoning laws; and
2. local laws governing:
i. planned development;
ii. subdivision; and
iii. other land use provisions.14
Special Exceptions Must be Consistent 
Reading the clarified law in its entirety, the legislature, at a minimum, 
changed the law prospectively to render illegal approval of a special 
exception in a non-priority funding area that does not further and is contrary 
to the seven specified elements of a comprehensive plan, or the first five 
elements if in a priority funding area. It did not directly or immediately 
affect the status of Terrapin Run. The state Department of the Environment 
(MDE), however, denied changes in water and sewerage categories 
necessary for Terrapin Run to proceed.15 The State Department of Planning, 
joining with MDE, rejected the county’s designation of the area as Tier II 
13. Ch. 180 § 1.02(c); MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE. § 1-304 (2017).
14. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1-417 (2012), amended by 2013 Md. Laws Ch.
674.
15. There is independent authority to deny changes in sewer service areas that are
inconsistent with a county’s comprehensive plan. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE §
9-501 et seq; § 9-506 (a)(1) (2017). For example, In The Matter of Global
Mission Church of Greater Washington SBC, Case. No. 10-C-08-003362, Cir. Ct.
Frederick County, Md. found the Frederick County Planning Commission acted
within its authority in denying the church’s application for a change in water and
sewer service category upon finding it was not consistent with the county’s
comprehensive plan.
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for future water and sewer service, arguing that it should be placed in Tier 
IV for no service and restricting development to minor subdivisions of 
seven or fewer lots served by well and septic. Following further litigation, 
mediation, threat of and rescue from foreclosure, the project appeared dead 
in 2013. The law would make future Terrapin Runs illegal. 
The Pooh Rule 
In commenting on the probability of bees noticing one conducting a 
balloon-assisted raid on their honey, Winnie the Pooh advised Christopher 
Robin: “They might or they might not. . . . You never can tell with bees.”16 
So it seems with the consistency doctrine in dealing with subdivisions and 
zoning. It is safe to say SGSDA replaced the “in harmony with” standard 
with the tighter definition of consistency. Thus, endeth the lesson in 
legislative clarity.  
The Maryland Department of Planning (MDP) has been circumspect in 
its exposition of the law. Its publication designed to prepare planning 
commissioners and members of boards of appeals for the statutorily 
mandatory course on their respective duties says that SGSDA clarifies 
“consistency” between comprehensive plans and local zoning ordinances 
and regulations. It then states that:  
In order to implement the 12 planning visions, the 1992 Economic 
Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act required all 
jurisdictions to adopt ordinances and regulations (this includes 
rezoning ordinances), planned development ordinances and 
regulations, subdivision ordinances and regulations, and other land 
use ordinances and regulations that are ‘consistent’ with the plan.17  
By adding the parenthetical reference to rezoning ordinances, MDP 
casually recognized that rezoning cases, unlike subdivisions and special 
exceptions, are the places where actions are most likely not to further the 
local comprehensive plan, or to be contrary to one or more of the seven 
items with which the law requires consistency. This is because Maryland 
courts have long held master plans have regulatory authority when local law 
requires subdivisions to be consistent with them. This linkage has enabled 
16. See A.A. MILNE, WINNIE THE POOH (Methuen & Co. Ltd. pub.) (1st ed. 1926).
17. Planning Commission, Planning Board, and Board of Appeals Education Course,
Module Two: The Comprehensive Plan, MD. PLANNING COMM’RS ASSOC. 2 – 1, 2
– 7 https://planning.maryland.gov/PDF/YourPart/
PlanningCommissionerTraining/Planning101_TheComprehensivePlan.pdf (last
visited May 18, 2017).
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regulators to impose conditions on subdivisions that reduce substantially the 
yield of space and units permitted by the property’s zoning.18  Zoning map 
amendments have a more complex relationship to comprehensive plans. 
Most zones are not linked to plans and can be applied without regard to 
plan recommendations so long as they meet other legal requirements. There 
are two basic forms of zoning actions. Individual zoning map amendments 
involve single parcels and usually are initiated by application of the 
property owner or contract purchaser. Comprehensive (or sectional) map 
amendments involve substantially more than a single parcel—even an entire 
county—and are initiated by the government.19  
Individual Map Amendments 
Individual map amendments are quasi-judicial in character and require a 
particularized finding of facts by the decision maker.20 A change in 
Euclidean zones, which usually contain fixed dimensional standards, 
requires a finding of change in the character of the neighborhood where the 
new zone is to be applied since the last comprehensive rezoning, or that 
there was a mistake in the original zoning of the property.21 A floating zone, 
which has been characterized as “in the nature of a special exception,” does 
not have to meet the Change-Mistake Rule and may be applied upon 
finding it meets the particular standards of its purpose clause. Prior to the 
SGSGA, local map amendments, whether they involved Euclidean or 
floating zones were not required to be consistent with the comprehensive 
plan unless the text of the applicable zone required it.22  
Unless otherwise conferred by statute or ordinance, standing to appeal an 
18. The Court of Appeals in Trail restated the rule from Mayor and Council of
Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 530 (2002) (internal citations
omitted). “We repeatedly have noted that plans, which are the result of work done
by planning commissions and adopted by ultimate zoning bodies, are advisory in
nature and have no force of law absent statutes or local ordinances linking
planning and zoning. Where the latter exist, however, they serve to elevate the
status of comprehensive plans to the level of true regulatory device…” 403 Md. at
527 n.5.
19. To avoid confusion between comprehensive plans and comprehensive zoning
map amendments, I shall, in most cases, refer to the latter as sectional map
amendments.
20. Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55 (1966).
21. The rule is based on the assumption that the comprehensive rezoning was a well-
conceived plan that took into account broad public interests, as contrasted with
the particular interests of a single landowner. Thus, there is a strong presumption
of the correctness of the original or comprehensive rezoning. See Barlow Burke,
Jr., The Change-Mistake Rule and Zoning in Maryland, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 631,
633 n.9 (1975) (noting the leading and related cases on the rule, the history of the
rule, and unjust criticism of the rule).
22. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. at 530 (2002); See Trail, 403 Md. 523.
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individual zoning map amendment decision is based on the proximity of the 
plaintiff’s property to the rezoned parcel. Property owners with land 
immediately adjoining or confronting the rezoned parcel have prime facie 
aggrievement. Other nearby owners whose property does not touch or 
confront the parcel may have “almost prime facie aggrievement” if they are 
not too far distant (e.g., 200-1000 feet) and allege “plus factors” of injury, 
such as noise, congestion, reduction in property value, etc. attributable to 
development that would occur under the change in zoning.23 
The standard of review for a local map amendment is limited to 
determining if the decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law 
and “whether the issue before the administrative body is ‘fairly debatable,’ 
that is, whether its determination is based upon evidence from which 
reasonable persons could come to different conclusions.”24 To be fairly 
debatable, a decision must be made in a quasi-judicial fact-finding process 
that includes opportunity for cross-examination and is supported by 
“substantial evidence” in the record as a whole.25 The only part of the 
individual map amendment process that is legislative is the final action of 
the local governing body that approves the amendment to its zoning map. 
Comprehensive/Sectional Zoning Map Amendments. 
Sectional map amendments are purely legislative acts. They are 
presumed valid, and absent specific statutory authority, judicial review is 
limited in scope to “assessing whether the agency was acting within its 
legal boundaries.”26 Prior to the SGSDA there was no requirement, absent a 
statute or ordinance, that a sectional zoning map amendment must be 
consistent with a comprehensive plan’s zoning recommendations.27 That 
statute now exists and provides the basis for a cause of action by an eligible 
complainant that alleges the action of the legislative body was illegal or 
23. Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 442 Md. 539 (2015); Ray v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 85 (2013); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County
Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 144 (1967).
24. Sembly v. County Bd. of Appeals of Baltimore County, 269 Md. 177, 182
(1973); see also Montgomery County v. Butler, 41 Md. 271, 283 (2010);
Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 171 (2001).
25. White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 44 (1999).
26. County Council of Prince George’s County v. Offen, 334 Md. 499 (1994);
Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 67
(1969). See also Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 362-63 (1982);
Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 706-07 (1977),
cert. denied sub nom. Funger v. Montgomery County, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978);
County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 701-02 (1975);
Montgomery County v. Leizman, 268 Md. 621, 631-33 (1973); Ark Readi-Mix
Concrete Corp. v. Smith, 251 Md. 1, 4 (1968).
27. See Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686.
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ultra vires; outside its legal boundaries because it does not further or is 
contrary to—i.e., is not consistent with—one or more of the enumerated 
plan elements in the SGSDA. But standing to bring suit to challenge 
inclusion in a comprehensive zoning amendment of parcels zoned 
inconsistently with the comprehensive plan may be harder to achieve under 
new rules enunciated by the Court of Appeals in April 2015. 
Taxpayers Left Standing: Bell and Harwood 
In paired cases arising from Anne Arundel County, the Court of Appeals 
distinguished the basis for standing in sectional map amendment cases from 
individual zoning cases. Following adoption of a new General Development 
Plan,28 Anne Arundel County in 2011 enacted a sectional map amendment 
covering 59,045 properties in the area of Thurgood Marshall Airport and 
the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. Zoning was changed on 264 parcels 
and the prior zoning was reconfirmed for the remaining parcels. Several 
individuals and civic organizations filed suit for declaratory judgment, 
alleging the county had engaged in spot and contract zoning by 
reclassifying certain parcels inconsistently with the plan. The county and 
intervening property owners moved to dismiss the citizens’ suit for lack of 
standing. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding the 
citizens failed to prove special aggrievement and that Maryland law did not 
support standing based on prime facie aggrievement for landowners by 
virtue of their proximity to the contested parcels. 
In Bell v. Anne Arundel County29 the Court of Special Appeals reversed, 
holding that adjoining, confronting, and nearby property owners 
challenging a local government land use decision had standing as prima 
facie aggrieved and other owners whose property was farther away were 
almost prima facie aggrieved by alleging other “plus factors” supporting 
injury.30 The effect of the Court of Special Appeals decision was to 
recognize no distinction between standing requirements for challengers of 
legislative acts such as sectional map amendments and those appealing 
quasi-judicial administrative decisions on individual zoning amendments.  
While review of Bell was pending before the Court of Appeals, a 
separate challenge to another Anne Arundel County sectional map 
amendment in the southern sector of the county came before the Court of 
28. Anne Arundel County General Development Plan, ANNE ARUNDEL CO. COUNCIL
1, 3 (Apr. 2009) http://www.aacounty.org/departments/planning-and-
zoning/forms-and-publications/GDP2009.pdf.
29. Bell v. Anne Arundel County, 215 Md. App. 161 (2013); cert. granted, Md. No.
29 (March 21, 2014); rev’d sub nom Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 442 Md. 539
(2015) (hereinafter “Anne Arundel v. Bell”).
30. Bell, 215 Md. App. at 183 (citing Ray, 430 Md. at 85).
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Special Appeals. In Harwood Civic Association v. Anne Arundel County,31 
landowners and civic associations challenged the rezoning of eight farm 
properties, of some 50 included in the amendment, as a violation of the 
consistency rule and as illegal spot zoning. Anne Arundel County Circuit 
Court again dismissed the case for lack of standing for all but two plaintiffs. 
Invoking its Bell decision, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding 
the plaintiffs had standing.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate court in both Bell and 
Harwood,  holding that plaintiffs challenging a sectional map amendment 
must demonstrate taxpayer standing.32 The Court concluded that proximity 
to rezoned property and near-proximity with “plus” factors, which 
conferred standing in local map amendment cases were inappropriate bases 
for contesting the purely legislative action involved in comprehensive 
rezoning. 
The principles underlying property owner standing, heretofore 
applied to judicial review actions and other modalities of judicial 
challenges to quasi-judicial and other administrative land use 
decisions, should not be extended to apply to challenges to 
comprehensive zoning legislative actions. Comprehensive zoning 
on the one hand, and quasi-judicial or administrative land use 
actions on the other, are not similar sufficiently in process or 
justification to warrant extension by analogy of property owner 
standing principles from the latter to the former. Rather, taxpayer 
standing is the correct standing doctrine which 
Respondents/Plaintiffs must satisfy before they may be allowed to 
maintain a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation.33 
The court pointed out that an individual rezoning action is decided on 
“individual, as opposed to general, grounds, and scrutinizes a single 
property”34 and (except for floating zones) must clear the threshold of the 
Change-Mistake Rule.35 Such actions are taken under procedural rules 
governing executive and administrative decision making that require at least 
one hearing and opportunity for cross-examination. The decision involves a 
factual determination by the zoning authority that is supported by 
substantial evidence of record. The action is legislative only at the end 
31. Anne Arundel County v. Harwood Civic Association, 442 Md. 595 (2015).
32. Anne Arundel v. Bell, 442 Md. at 586.
33. Id. at 551 n.5.
34. Id at 555 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
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because the legislative body must enact a resolution or ordinance amending 
the zoning map. Rooted in the common law of private nuisance, standing to 
challenge such actions depends on proximity of challengers to the property 
at issue. Adjacent and confronting owners are considered to be prime facie 
aggrieved, and thus have standing to seek relief from the courts. Other 
nearby owners (the court found no case allowing standing to complainants 
with property more than 1000 feet from the rezoned parcel) may be 
considered “almost prime facie” aggrieved if they offer additional “plus 
factors” asserting injury.36  
Summarizing Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop37 and Mayor 
and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises,38 the Court emphasized that 
comprehensive rezoning differs from individual zoning cases in process,  
geographic scope, and the standard of review. The process is 
legislative in its entirety. No significant judicial function is 
involved. It is initiated by the legislative body and usually involves 
an area containing a considerable number of properties. Rather than 
making a particularized determination regarding a single property, 
the legislative body considers broad policy issues of future public 
needs and the relationship of the matter to the public health, safety, 
and general welfare. Comprehensive zonings ‘are limited only by 
the general boundaries of …appropriate procedural and due process 
considerations.’39   
The standard of review is whether the legislature had any reasonable basis 
for its action.  
In a detailed exegesis of the Superblock Trilogy40 and State Center41, the 
Court distinguished administrative and executive land use decisions that 
focus on the particular facts of a single parcel and legislative actions that 
consider general issues of public policy. Standing based on proximity of 
property ownership applied to the former, but had not been applied to 
“judicial challenges to legislative acts reached through solely legislative 
36. Id. at 559.
37. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686.
38. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514.
39. Id. at 533.
40. 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253
(2009) (hereinafter “Superblock I”); 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309 (2010) (hereinafter “Superblock II”);
120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 426 Md. 14
(2011) (hereinafter “Superblock III”).
41. State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Limited Partnership, 438 Md. 451
(2014).
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processes.”42  Pointing out that the Anne Arundel sectional map amendment 
challenged in Bell involved 59,045 parcels, the Court mused that granting 
standing on the basis of property ownership might make eligible plaintiffs 
of owners of all those parcels as well as other owners of property adjoining, 
confronting, or within 200 to 1000 feet of the perimeter of the rezoned 
area.43 Hypothesizing an exponential increase in suits brought by property 
owners suffering no greater harm than that experienced by the general 
public, the Court concluded: 
The doctrine of taxpayer standing—already available to some 
complainants challenging administrative land use decisions—         
is the appropriate standing doctrine that complainants challenging 
comprehensive zoning legislation must satisfy.44 
   To attain taxpayer standing, a complainant must allege (1) it is a 
taxpayer, (2) the suit is brought on behalf of all other taxpayers in a class 
suffering the same injury, (3) the governmental action is illegal or ultra 
vires, and (4) the action specially injures the taxpayer by resulting in a 
pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes. (5) Finally, there must be a “nexus” 
between the government’s action, the potential pecuniary loss, and the 
potential for the remedy to alleviate the harm to the plaintiff and all 
similarly situated taxpayers.45 
The Court was sanguine about the ability of taxpayers, whether they 
owned directly affected property or not, to attain standing to challenge 
comprehensive zoning amendments. The litigants in both Bell and 
Harwood, however, were denied standing. The Court assumed at least two 
Bell plaintiffs were taxpayers. They alleged the county engaged in illegal 
spot zoning of certain properties included in the comprehensive zoning 
action, satisfying one prong of the standing test. They failed, however, to 
allege a pecuniary loss or increase in their taxes as a consequence of the 
action.46 Harwood’s plaintiffs also relied exclusively on property owner 
standing. Although the Court thought one plaintiff may have met two of the 
requirements for taxpayer standing by alleging the decision would increase 
her taxes and that the rezoning of particular properties was impermissible 
spot zoning, she had waived claiming taxpayer standing.47   
42. Anne Arundel v. Bell, 442 Md. at 569.
43. Id. at 570.
44. Id. at 575.
45. Id. at 577-79.
46. Id. at 584-86.
47. Harwood, 442 Md. at 613-15.
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The Court majority bushed aside the dissenters’ concern that taxpayer 
standing could severely circumscribe the ability of aggrieved property 
owners to challenge a comprehensive zoning action, citing a number of 
cases in which it had been successfully maintained to challenge both 
executive and legislative actions.48 Theoretically, if it satisfied all prongs of 
the test, any taxpayer can bring suit under taxpayer doctrine since proximity 
to a questioned parcel is unnecessary. There will likely one or more 
taxpayers with property covered by the comprehensive zoning amendment 
and even more located outside it that will experience the same effects from 
the action. But taxpayer standing presumes tax effects, such as a tax 
increase or at least a pecuniary loss, as a consequence of the zoning action. 
If a complainant’s property value has been diminished by a sectional map 
amendment, that should satisfy the requirement of special harm, even 
though taxes would, thereby, also be reduced. The requirement is pecuniary 
injury OR a tax increase.49 This harm must be shared with other taxpayers 
and the relief sought must alleviate the injury or tax burden.50  
Parties whose properties are rezoned to lower densities or less desirable 
uses than were previously permitted are frequent challengers of 
comprehensive zoning amendments. It seems unlikely taxpayer standing 
doctrine will affect the ability of such complainants to achieve standing. 
The Court casually observed that in Anderson House v. Mayor and City 
Council of Rockville51 the plaintiff was entitled to review of the claim that 
its rights were affected by the change in zoning imposed by a sectional map 
amendment. Anderson House did not plead as a taxpayer but as an owner 
objecting to the zone applied to its property. The Court of Appeals held the 
circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal by virtue of a city ordinance 
enacted pursuant to state law52 or under the Declaratory Judgment Act.53 
The allegation that the zone applied to its property failed to meet the 
48. Taxpayer standing to challenge executive actions: State Center, 438 Md. at 583;
Superblock I, 407 Md. at 269-70; Inlet Associates v. Assateague House
Condominium Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 440-43 (1988).  Taxpayer standing to
challenge legislative actions: Ansell v. Howard County Council, 264 Md. 629,
634 (1972); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106 (1890);
Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226 (1999).
49. 438 Md. at 556–57, 92 A.3d at 463 (quoting Citizens Planning and Housing
Association v. County Executive of Baltimore County, 273 Md. 333, 339 (1974)).
The dissenting opinion in Bell surmised taxpayer standing could not be achieved
if taxes do not increase. That seems an overreaction to the majority opinion.
However, if the potential plaintiff’s property has its value increased by the zoning
action, the resulting increase in taxes incident to an increase in property value has
not been considered an actionable injury.
50. State Center, 438 Md. at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
51. Bellamy v. State, 400 Md. 646 (2007).
52. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 4-406 (2017).
53. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & J. PROC. §§ 3-403, 3-406, and 3-409 (2017).
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requirement that zones treat uniformly all property to which they are 
applied satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. Pecuniary loss or a resulting increase in taxation of the 
plaintiff and similarly situated taxpayers, were not at issue.  
Ultimately, the requirement of taxpayer standing may not bar the 
courthouse door to parties offended by the zones bestowed by sectional map 
amendments. Maryland jurisdictions either grant the right of judicial review 
by circuit court of individual and comprehensive zoning actions to 
aggrieved parties, or even any parties participating in the zoning process.54 
Could Anderson House have qualified for taxpayer standing? It clearly 
was not acting as a private attorney general to vindicate the public interest 
against an illegal act of the government. But with modest creativity in the 
bill of complaint, Anderson House might have metamorphosed into a 
taxpayer with standing had it not gained it by way of the city code. It made 
a good faith allegation that the rezoning of its property was an ultra vires 
act. It was a taxpayer. No allegation was made that taxes would be 
increased, but it could make a palpable claim of pecuniary loss due to the 
down zoning, which prevented development of a larger office building.55 
The rub comes in showing explicitly or implicitly that the harm it suffered 
was shared by a similarly situated class of taxpayers. “In other words, the 
allegations of the injury must apply to all taxpayers in the assumed class 
and not merely the plaintiffs as private complainants, in order for the 
taxpayer standing doctrine to apply.”56 
Because Anderson House was the only property owner so affected, a 
liberal application of the rule would be required to conjure a class. That was 
conceivably available since it claimed the zone applied to it and other 
54. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 4-401 covers all jurisdictions outside Baltimore
City and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. It allows
any person aggrieved by the action, taxpayers, and local officials to file for
judicial review of a zoning action of a board of appeals or legislative body.
Similar provisions for Baltimore City are provided in Section 10-501. In M-
NCPPC jurisdictions, Section 22-402 allows any aggrieved person or any person
that appeared at the hearing, in person, by attorney, or in writing in Montgomery
County, to request judicial review of an individual or sectional map amendment.
Section 22-407, governing Prince George’s County, allows appeals by any
municipality, taxing district, person, civic or homeowners association, or
aggrieved applicant to seek judicial review of an individual or sectional map
amendment.
55. “[A] party, as a taxpayer, may satisfy the ‘special damage’ standing requirement
by alleging both ‘1) an action by a municipal corporation or public official that is
illegal or ultra vires, and 2) that the action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s
property, meaning that it reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer
or an increase in taxes.’” Kendall v. Howard County, 431 Md. 590, 605 (2013)
(quoting Superblock I, 407 Md. at 267).
56. State Center, 438 Md. at 554-55.
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properties did not treat them uniformly, even though the other owners may 
not have suffered pecuniary loss or a tax increase. A more creative 
argument might allege that the suit was in behalf of all taxpayers, since the 
down zoning would result in a possible loss to the city treasury, which 
could result in a general tax increase. There was a clear nexus between the 
alleged injury and the zoning action and a declaratory judgment could 
remedy the alleged wrong. Dicta in Bell suggests courts should erect a high 
threshold of solemnity when applying the laugh test to assertions of 
taxpayer standing. It is doubtful, however, that Anderson House could have 
lost its case on the merits more gracefully had it achieved standing as a 
taxpayer instead of as a disgruntled property owner.  
Retrofitting Anderson House suggests that in comprehensive zoning 
cases that adversely affect a single party, it may be difficult to meet all 
prongs of the taxpayer standing rule. But it is hard to imagine an affected 
owner would be denied standing to vindicate its private property interest 
against alleged unlawful government action. In such instances it may be 
necessary to sue for damages under regulatory taking doctrine instead of 
seeking a declaratory judgment or injunction. That route, however, is not a 
particularly promising option if the comprehensive zoning has left the 
property with reasonable uses and has not singled it out for arbitrary 
action.57 Historically, suits by disappointed owners challenging 
classification of their property in lower densities or more limited uses as 
part of comprehensive zoning amendments, or claims of denial of due 
process, have not fared well in Maryland courts.58  
Taxpayer standing is an awkward fit for an owner of down zoned 
property with a minimal deep interest in serving as private attorney general. 
It presents greater challenges for citizens performing that role with more 
enthusiasm, particularly if they have no directly impacted property or 
increased tax liability. Bell and Harwood suggest that citizen/taxpayer suits 
to enforce the consistency rule are likely to increase, particularly in 
situations where a sectional map amendment is used as a Christmas tree for 
selectively favored owners whose applications could not survive the 
individual rezoning process.   
The Court of Appeals offered Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore59 as an example of how well taxpayer standing can work. Several 
57. “For an individual property owner to escape the binding impact of a
comprehensive rezoning he must show that the plan lacks the necessary
relationship to the general public interest and welfare that is presumed or that the
effect of the plan is to deprive him of any reasonable use of his property.”
Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 67
(1969).
58. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
59. See White, 356 Md. 226.
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taxpayers filed for declaratory judgment and an interlocutory injunction to 
invalidate an urban renewal ordinance. The Court found they achieved 
taxpayer standing, although few, if any of them lived in the renewal area, 
because they alleged the city’s action was illegal and ultra vires, and that 
they and other taxpayers would be damaged by increased taxes to pay for 
the redevelopment of the area.  
In contrast with the situation in Boitnott, the Harwood and Bell plaintiffs 
had harder cases to make. Some alleged their property values would fall, 
thus incurring a pecuniary loss. If there were more than one, they had an 
ostensible class. The overall thrust of the comprehensive zoning, however, 
was to increase densities and, thus, revenue yields. As a consequence, other 
taxpayers could see a reduction in taxes; or if taxes rose, it would be a result 
of increased property values, which is generally not considered an injury to 
the taxpayer. If there was any tax effect, it was unlikely to be different than 
that enjoyed by the general public.  
Plaintiffs like those in Boitnott that do not own property directly affected 
by the rezoning must be creative in alleging the special aggrievement 
necessary for taxpayer standing. The basic difference between citizen 
complainants and owners of down zoned property is that the former are 
suing to vindicate the public interest in enforcing the consistency rule while 
the latter are likely suing for relief from its application to their property. It 
would be ironic indeed if it became more difficult for proponents of 
consistency to achieve standing than its opponents.  
Assuming complainants achieve standing as taxpayers or by statutes 
granting right of appeal to circuit court, the consistency doctrine is likely to 
have different effects in cases involving individual and comprehensive 
zoning amendments, and in priority funding areas (PFAs) and the areas 
outside them.  
Potential Effects of the Consistency Rule in Priority Funding Areas 
Individual Map Amendments 
The logic of Smart Growth is to concentrate growth in each county’s 
priority funding areas (PFAs)--relatively compact, moderate-to-high density 
areas with supporting infrastructure. That objective can be facilitated by 
adopting current, well-designed comprehensive plans that identify strategic 
locations for changes in land use and major increases in density and 
implementing them with consistent zoning and timely capital 
improvements.  
The SGSDA, as noted above, provides for exemptions from consistency 
for land uses, densities and intensities—the most definitive features of a 
zoning class. The preamble of the SGSDA explains the purpose of the 
exemptions is to permit bonus densities and mixed uses in priority funding 
134 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development  Vol. 6 
areas.60 The exemptions, however, may perversely create obstacles rather 
than facilitate well-planned and orderly development and redevelopment, 
especially if a jurisdiction adopts a comprehensive plan but does not follow 
up with a sectional map amendment.   
In the absence of a consistent sectional map amendment the initiative lies 
with developers to apply for rezoning of individual prime parcels for more 
dense or different land uses. Assuming no conflict with the plan’s 
recommendations for the timing or pattern of development, the principal 
constraint on approving an individual rezoning application, whether or not 
it is consistent with the plan, is the requirement to establish change in the 
character of the neighborhood since the last comprehensive zoning, or if a 
floating zone, that its purposes are met. If these hurdles are cleared, zones 
can be approved that may not advance, or may even be contrary to, the 
recommendations of the plan, which remains merely a guide, as it was 
when Terrapin Run was decided.  
A different problem could result if a consistent sectional map amendment 
is adopted that basically ratifies existing conditions. By setting a new 
zoning baseline it would be almost impossible to approve an individual 
zoning application that increased density or introduced different uses 
because a change in the character of the neighborhood could not be shown. 
This would maintain consistency with the plan’s lack of interest in 
achieving much but frustrate the SGSDA’s ostensible objective of 
encouraging higher densities and mixed uses in PFAs.  
In a final scenario, if an ambitious comprehensive plan recommends new 
higher density centers of growth but, again, is not followed with a 
consistent sectional map amendment, it cannot be implemented through 
individual map amendments using Euclidean zones if no change occurred in 
the character of the neighborhood since the last comprehensive zoning. On 
the other hand, if change is established, an individual rezoning could be 
approved whether it is consistent or not with the plan.  
Floating zones can evade the change-mistake problem, and given the 
ingenuity of the land use bar, such zones or text amendments to zones 
already on the ground are likely to be drafted to permit new uses and 
densities. A potential issue with floating zones is that they are regarded as 
analogous to special exceptions, which the SGSDA requires, without 
exception, to be consistent with the comprehensive plan. If that analogy 
were to be taken seriously, a floating zone that is inconsistent with the plan 
60. S.B. 280, 1999 Leg. (Md. 2009) “WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General
Assembly to encourage the development of ordinances and regulations that apply
to locally designated priority funding areas and allow for mixed uses and bonus
densities beyond those specified in the local comprehensive plan by excluding
land uses and densities or intensities in the definition of “consistency” for priority
funding areas” Id.
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should not be approved. 
Even if an individual rezoning application is consistent with the plan, and 
meets all the necessary requirements for approval, the applicant bears high 
transaction costs to satisfy the quasi-judicial procedural requirements for a 
local map amendment. These include the talent and time required to secure 
approval, risks of denial, and regardless of the decision, appeal. Any change 
in zoning in or near residential neighborhoods poses organized community 
opposition, which is often a barrier to increased development in PFAs.61   
Ultimately, depending upon parcel by parcel rezoning at the initiative of 
landowners and developers abdicates public responsibility for orderly 
redevelopment of priority funding areas. If the Change-Mistake Rule were 
abandoned in favor of consistency doctrine, it would be possible to approve 
a consistent local map amendment in all the above scenarios. The 
exemptions of land uses and density or intensity from consistency in PFAs 
is not consistent with smart growth or effective planning.  
Sectional (Comprehensive) Map Amendments 
Only a small proportion of land in PFAs is suitable for high-density, 
transit-oriented, walkable, mixed-use communities envisioned in state smart 
growth policies. Much of it contains existing buildings that remain 
profitable, even if they are not the highest and best uses of the land. It may 
require substantial increases in density to justify demolition and 
redevelopment. In the face of opposition to large density increases from 
current owners, tenants, and adjacent neighborhoods, there are strong 
economic incentives for owners of land at the periphery of central areas, 
and of vacant or underutilized land some distance away, to seek more 
intensive uses. This perverse incentive is facilitated by the fairly lax way in 
which counties have drawn their PFAs. Cheap land, willing sellers, easy 
sewer access, slight community opposition, and a permissive plan are the 
basic ingredients for disorganized sprawl.  
Priority funding areas in the state’s five metropolitan counties encompass 
from a third to more than half of all land, including wide swaths of 
established low and medium density residential neighborhoods. In 
developing and rural counties, PFAs tend to encompass all land with 
existing or planned sewerage service; most of it unlikely to become 
candidates for intensive planned development. Pressure can be intense for 
61. Casey Dawkins et al., Barriers to Development Inside Maryland’s Priority
Funding Areas: Perspectives of Planners, Developers, and Advocates, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR SMART GROWTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2012)
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/PDF/YourPart/773/20120130/PFA-
Barriers20120130.pdf.
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scattered higher density land uses in these areas where land is less 
expensive but sewer is programmed. 
The exemptions to uses, density and intensity for PFAs allow a locality 
to adopt sectional map amendments that allow for more, or less, than its 
comprehensive plan proposes. On the other hand, if a comprehensive plan is 
adopted but no implementing sectional map amendment is enacted, 
individual zoning amendments, even if consistent with the plan, must meet 
the requirements of the Change-Mistake Rule. Either way, the exemptions 
undermine the significance of the comprehensive plan. The best way to 
achieve Smart Growth objectives is to put them in regularly updated 
comprehensive plans and implement them with comprehensive zoning 
amendments. The exemptions for PFAs do not work any better with 
comprehensive rezoning than without it.  
Change v. Consistency Doctrine in Non-PFAs 
Because of the exemptions, consistency doctrine can be expected to have 
greater force and engender more litigation outside PFAs. The corollary of 
policies to concentrate growth in high-density centers is to reduce densities 
elsewhere to protect agriculture, rural communities, open space, and natural 
resources. Consequently, comprehensive plans and sectional map 
amendments implementing them will involve down zoning of substantial 
areas of land.  
The prospect of losing the potential for urban or suburban development 
will inspire some landowners to try to improve their fortunes by persuading 
the local legislative body to bestow a higher density zone on their 
properties. Lawsuits can be expected from disappointed owners of down 
zoned land, alleging regulatory takings as well as pecuniary losses. 
Sympathetic treatment of such owners by retaining or increasing the density 
permitted on their properties will almost surely generate citizen/taxpayer 
suits like Bell and Harwood, alleging the enclaves of up zoned land violate 
the consistency requirement. Assuming both categories of complainants 
achieve standing, those protesting consistent down zoning ought to expect 
more difficulty prevailing on the merits than those protesting inconsistent 
up zoning.  
Individual Map Amendments 
The legal boundary for idiosyncratic zoning is more restrictive outside 
PFAs where uses and density are not exempted from the consistency 
requirement. As a result, consistency could replace the Change-Mistake 
Rule as a basic requirement for approval of an individual map amendment.   
Logic would suggest that even though an individual rezoning applicant 
succeeds in producing substantial evidence of change in the character of the 
neighborhood and that the proposed zone is otherwise an appropriate use 
for the site, it should be denied upon a finding that the proposed zone is not 
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consistent with the comprehensive plan’s specific recommendations for the 
property. This is because approval would not further and would be contrary 
to one or more of the elements with which the zone must be consistent. That 
result would accord with decisions of courts in other states that require 
consistency of zoning actions with plans.  
A plan that designates a particular zone for application to a specific 
parcel leaves less room for interpretation than one that merely recommends 
a land use that might be satisfied by several zones to be applied case-by-
case by local map amendment. Local governments are allowed considerable 
discretion when a plan’s language is aspirational (should) rather than 
obligatory (shall/must) in describing uses or development standards; or uses 
ranges for heights and densities.62  
States that require consistency vary in the degree of deference granted 
local governments in interpreting their plans. California courts will reverse 
a finding of consistency  “. . . only if, based on the evidence before City 
Council, a reasonable person could not have reached the same 
conclusion.”63 Florida, however, rejects the “fairly debatable standard” for 
determining whether a land use action is consistent with a comprehensive 
plan and instead subjects them to “strict scrutiny.” As applied in the land 
use context, strict scrutiny is not quite the same as the rule applied in cases 
claiming infringement of constitutional rights. Rather, it “arises from the 
necessity of strict compliance with comprehensive plan.”64 In reviewing 
whether a zoning action is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan: 
The test . . . is whether the zoning authority’s determination that a 
proposed development conforms to each element and the objectives 
of the land use plan is supported by competent and substantial 
evidence. The traditional and non-deferential standard of strict 
judicial scrutiny applies. 
Strict scrutiny is not defined in the land use cases which use the 
phrase but its meaning can be ascertained from the common 
definition of the separate words. Strict implies rigid exactness, 
People v. Gardiner, 33 A.D. 204, 53 N.Y.S. 451 (1893), or 
precision, Black’s Law Dictionary 1275 (5th ed. 1979). A thing 
62. See generally Brian W. Ohm, Let the Courts Guide You: Planning and Zoning
Consistency, AM. PLANNING ASSOC. No. 11 (Nov. 2005) (summarizing a number
of cases from Maine, California, Washington, and Florida).
63. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 196 Cal. App. 3d 223, 234 (1987) (internal
citations omitted).
64. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469
(1993).
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scrutinized has been subjected to minute investigation. 
Commonwealth v. White, 271 Pa. 584, 115 A. 870 (1922). Strict 
scrutiny is thus the process whereby a court makes a detailed 
examination of a statute, rule or order of a tribunal for exact 
compliance with, or adherence to, a standard or norm. It is the 
antithesis of a deferential review.65  
Under this standard of review, one proposing a change in zoning has the 
burden of proving it is consistent with the plan. The burden then shifts to 
the government to demonstrate retaining the existing classification serves a 
legitimate public purpose and of showing that the refusal to rezone the 
property is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.66 It is not clear 
that the Florida Supreme Court would be satisfied with a finding that was 
only fairly debatable. It appears to have softened the view of the lower court 
that the government must prove “. . .by clear and convincing evidence that a 
specifically stated public necessity requires a specified, more restrictive, 
use.”67 However, it concluded that:  
While they may be useful, the board will not be required to make 
findings of fact. However, in order to sustain the board’s action, 
upon review by certiorari in the circuit court it must be shown that 
there was competent substantial evidence presented to the board to 
support its ruling.68 
The full impact of strict scrutiny review was demonstrated in Pinecrest 
Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel.69 An adjoining property owner challenged approval of 
a site plan as inconsistent with the county comprehensive plan. After the 
intervening developer prevailed at trial, based on a “fairly debatable” 
standard of review for the county’s decision, it proceeded to develop while 
the case was pending on appeal. The appellate court ordered trial de novo 
on the consistency issue and the trial court found the county’s development 
order was not consistent with the comprehensive plan. The court then 
approved the remedy requested by the citizens: demolition of the buildings 
that had been constructed. On appeal, the 4th District Court of Appeal 
upheld the lower court’s finding of inconsistency and the judgment. It 
rejected the idea that the local government was entitled to a high degree of 
deference in interpreting its plan when the consistency of its actions with 
65. Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (1987).
66. Snyder, 627 So.2d at 476.
67. Id. at 471 (citing Snyder v. Board of County Com’rs of Brevard County, 595
So.2d 65 (1991)) (internal citations omitted).
68. Id. at 476.
69. Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So.2d 191 (2001).
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the plan were at issue. Under Florida’s Growth Management Act of 1985,70 
the court said:  
“Deference by the courts . . . would not only be inconsistent with the text 
and structure of the statute, but it would ignore the very reasons for 
adopting the legislation in the first place.”71 In 2014 the Florida Legislature 
repealed the 1984 Growth Management Act. Among provisions of the 
Community Development Act that replaced it was reinstatement of the 
“fairly debatable” standard for review of third party challenges to changes 
in classification of individual parcels. 
In the leading state case on consistency, Fasano v. Board of 
Commissioners of Washington County,72 the Oregon Supreme Court held 
that:  
[I]t is clear that under our statutes the plan adopted by the planning
commission and the zoning ordinances enacted by the county
governing body are closely related; both are intended to be parts of
a single integrated procedure for land use control. The plan
embodies policy determinations and guiding principles; the zoning
ordinances provide the detailed means of giving effect to those
principles.” ***
We believe that the state legislature has conditioned the county’s
power to zone upon the prerequisite that the zoning attempt to
further the general welfare of the community through
consciousness, in a prospective sense, of the factors mentioned
above. In other words, except as noted later in this opinion, it must
be proved that the change is in conformance with the
comprehensive plan.73
Each of these cases dealt with individual zoning map amendments or 
subdivision/site plan actions. Each of the state courts framed them as quasi-
judicial actions and applied a more rigorous standard of review than the test 
generally applied to legislative actions. Requiring consistency with the 
70. Growth Management Act of 1985, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-163.3215 (1995).
71. 795 So.2d at 202.
72. Fasano v. Board of Commissioners of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
73. Id. at 27-28. The exceptions noted later involved procedural matters rather than
exceptions to the consistency test. The court added: “In proving that the change is
in conformance with the comprehensive plan in this case, the proof, at a
minimum, should show (1) there is a public need for a change of the kind in
question, and (2) that need will be best served by changing the classification of
the particular piece of property in question as compared with other available
property.” Id. at 28.
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comprehensive plan may add an additional hurdle to rezoning that clears the 
Change-Mistake Rule, and could effectively displace it. A consistency rule 
also could affect the use of floating zones, depending on the flexibility or 
ambiguity of the plan’s land use and zoning directives.  
The situation and cases above dealt with local map amendments that 
involved neighborhood change but a proposed zone that was found to be 
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Under SGSDA, however, a 
finding that a proposal  “furthers and is not contrary” to the elements of the 
comprehensive plan should logically trump the “no change” finding. This is 
because the governmental “action” of denial would not further and would 
be contrary to the plan.74 As the consistency rule takes hold and all 
Maryland jurisdictions adopt and maintain comprehensive plans, the 
Change-Mistake Rule may have outlived its usefulness as a barrier to 
piecemeal zoning in non-priority funding areas.  
Sectional Map Amendments 
The most interesting cases involving the consistency doctrine outside 
PFAs are likely to arise in rural areas where most of the zoning in the 
sectional map amendment is consistent with the comprehensive plans but a 
few parcels are placed in zones that appear contrary to the plan’s 
recommendations. Although defeated by lack of standing, the complaints of 
Bell and Harwood, together with a circuit court case, Bilek v. the County 
Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County,75 illustrate some of the issues 
litigants and courts will confront. 
 In November 2011 the Queen Anne’s County Board of Commissioners 
(BOC) enacted a comprehensive rezoning ordinance (sectional map 
amendment) covering eleven parcels. Four environmental groups and 14 
residents filed suit claiming that the rezoning of four of the properties was 
not consistent with the county’s comprehensive plan. All four properties 
were in an area designated by the county’s comprehensive plan for “Rural 
Agricultural” use or “Permanently Preserved Land.” A 216-acre property 
was rezoned from Agricultural (AG) to Light Industrial Highway Services 
(LIHS). An 80-acre parcel was rezoned from Countryside (CS) to 
Neighborhood Village Center. Thirty-one acres of a third, 173+-acre parcel, 
74. Overturning denial of a consistent individual map amendment, however, would
not automatically impose the requested zone. Although an individual map
amendment involves quasi-judicial fact finding, its completion requires a
legislative act. A legislative body has discretion to approve or deny it. Courts
cannot not compel a county to approve a zoning amendment; even one consistent
with its plan. Mandamus will not lie to compel a discretionary or legislative act.
Talbot County. v. Miles Point Property, LLC, 415 Md. 372, 377 (2010).
75. Circuit Ct. for Queen Anne’s County, Case No. 17-C-11-16677, (August 7, 2012)
(hereinafter “Bilek”).
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was rezoned from Agricultural (AG) to Suburban Commercial (SC) and the 
remaining 142 acres were rezoned Suburban Estate (SE). Finally, a 55-acre 
property was rezoned from Agricultural (AG) to Suburban Commercial 
(SC). The county’s planning commission recommended against rezoning all 
four properties as contrary to the comprehensive plan. The BOC, 
nonetheless, found each was consistent with it.  
With no facts in dispute, plaintiffs sought summary judgment on grounds 
the BOC exceeded its authority by rezoning the properties in a way that was 
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The BOC moved to dismiss or 
for summary judgment, arguing it had wide discretion in the legislative act 
of rezoning.  
Standing was not at issue. The circuit court first considered whether the 
commissioners acted within their legal boundaries. Second it addressed 
whether the zoning actions met the requirements of state and county law for 
consistency with the comprehensive plan.  
In rezoning the 216-acre parcel the court found the BOC clearly had not 
acted within its legal boundaries because application of the LIHS Zone was 
restricted to key intersections along the U.S. 301 corridor and the fact that 
“the property simply does not lie within the area specified by the statute for 
this particular zoning classification.”76  Summary judgment was granted for 
plaintiffs with respect to that parcel without addressing the consistency 
question. 
The other three zoning actions required the court to consider the 
consistency issue. It found the 2009 amendments to Article 66B required 
the county’s zoning and development regulations to further, and not be 
contrary to” seven specified items in its comprehensive plan.77 A relevant 
provision of the Queen Anne’s County Zoning Code reinforced that 
requirement, stating its purpose was to implement the comprehensive plan 
. . . by “Giving effect to policies and proposals of the Comprehensive 
Plan. . . ,”78  
The court pointed out that for individual zoning map amendments, the 
county code required the BOC to make a determination “based on specific 
facts contained in the record” that “substantial change has occurred in the 
76. Id. at 8 n.3. The court elaborated: “It is inarguable that the County
Commissioners have the legisltive authority to correct this legal mistake by
amending the County Zoning Ordinance. However, at this point the LIHS District
is limited to the Route 301 corridor and the Court cannot somehow infer that this
parcel of land at a U.S. Route 50 intersectiobn somehow lies within the Route
301 corridor, or on the record before it, can provide safe acess/egress to sites
along same.” Id.
77. MD. CODE ANN., srt. 66B §§1.02(c), 4.03, and 4.09.
78. QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, MD., CODE, §18:1-4 (2005).
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character of the neighborhood where the property is located” or a “mistake 
was made in the existing zoning classification.”79 Comprehensive rezoning 
did not require making such findings, “provided that the map amendments 
are consistent with the goals and purposes of the Comprehensive Plan then 
in effect.”80 
The BOC contended its actions were part of a comprehensive 
rezoning and, thus, it was not required to find change had occurred 
or to make quasi-judicial findings of fact on the merits of the 
rezoning.81   
The court accepted the commissioners’ representation of their action as 
comprehensive to narrow the focus of the case, but it was clearly skeptical, 
noting: “the rezoning in this case has the appearance of spot zoning, rather 
than part of a ‘comprehensive rezoning’ process.”82 But even assuming it 
was part of a comprehensive rezoning, the court said that: “For a rezoning 
ordinance, to pass muster, . . . it must be consistent with the Comprehensive 
Plan which means that the ordinance will ‘further, and not be contrary to’ 
the seven criteria enumerated in § 1.02(c) and it must meet the consistency 
requirements of § 4.03(a).”83 The court concluded that the BOC had not: “ 
. . . adequately demonstrated or set forth facts in their Findings and 
Decision to show that they addressed the constituency requirements of 
Article 66B § 1.02(c) and § 4.03(a) regarding the 2010 Comprehensive Plan 
or that they designed the Ordinance to address the purposes of § 4.03(b)(1)-
(7).”84 Absent a record showing such consideration, there were disputed 
issues of material fact, so the court denied summary judgment for either 
party as to the three properties.  
The BOC abandoned the case before going to trial, deciding: “that 
expending further legal effort and dollars to try to uphold earlier rezoning 
on four farm properties from agricultural to commercial/residential was ‘not 
warranted.’”85 It is a fair inference that they concluded they could not 
demonstrate the rezonings were consistent with the plan, and probably 
could not convince a court that they were little more than an attempt to 
bundle local map amendments and pass them off as part of comprehensive 
79. QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, MD., CODE, § 18:1-222(B).
80. QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, MD., CODE, § 18:1-222(F) (2005).
81. Hyson, 242 Md. 55.
82. Bilek, at *11 (citing Anderson House v. Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 707-708 n.17
(2008)).
83. Id. at *12.
84. Id. at *13.
85. 2 THE QUEEN ANNE’S CHRONICLE 6, 4 (Nov./Dec. 2012) (citing board minutes
for August 28).
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rezoning.  
Since standing was not at issue in Bilek it is not possible to know if the 
plaintiffs could have sustained their suit as taxpayers. They do not seem to 
have alleged any special pecuniary loss or that their taxes would have 
increased as a consequence of the contested rezonings. Allegation that the 
BOC’s action exceeded its legal boundaries by rezoning certain parcels 
inconsistently with the comprehensive plan was accepted as a cause of 
action. This was in line with Court of Appeals dicta in Harwood musing 
that the requirement of alleging illegal or ulta vires governmental action 
was satisfied by the allegations of impermissible spot zoning of certain 
parcels, constituting arbitrary and capricious action in violation of the 
consistency requirement of the state land use code.86  
Discussion by the Court of Special Appeals in Bell and Harwood, and 
the circuit court in Bilek, suggest the kind of reasoning needed to overcome 
the strong presumption of validity for comprehensive zoning. In each case, 
plaintiffs sought invalidation of the zoning of specific parcels rather than 
the entire ordinance. They alleged not only that the specific parcels were 
classified in zones that were inconsistent with the comprehensive plan but 
also were impermissible spot zoning. These are separate arguments that 
may not always overlap. Both seek to pierce the veil of comprehensive 
zoning to apply a less deferential test of the validity of the zoning applied to 
certain parcels than to the legislation as a whole. But the tests to be applied 
are different. An inconsistent zone may not be spot zoning (at least in a 
PFA), but spot zoning is almost certain to be inconsistent.  
Consistency is the slipperier concept. The land use recommendations of a 
comprehensive plan may range from a general use that embraces several 
Euclidean and floating zones—e.g., “rural” or “medium-density 
residential”—or specify a specific use or density that can be permitted only 
by a particular zone. In Montgomery County, for example, the Functional 
Master Plan for Agriculture and Rural Open Space contains specific zoning 
recommendations. Otherwise, the Montgomery County Zoning Code’s one 
agricultural zone and four rural residential zones, as well as three residential 
estate zones arguably could be consistent with “rural” land uses.87  At least 
six zones conceivably could satisfy a “moderate density residential” 
recommendation in a plan. The more specific the plan, the less wiggle room 
86. Harwood, 442 Md. at 614.
87. A general “rural” land use might be satisfied by the Agricultural Reserve (AR)
Zone with a density of one dwelling per 25 acres; the Rural (R), Rural Cluster
(RC), or Rural Neighborhood Cluster (RNC) zones—each densities of one
dwelling per five acres; and three Residential Estate zones  with densities of one
to two acres. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE, Ch. 59 §§ 4.2.1, 4.3.3-4.3.5,
4.4.4-4.4.6 (2014).
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is available for the local legislature in choosing which zones to apply. 
Showing the zoning is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan is only 
the first step in a successful challenge for the would-be taxpayer plaintiff. 
The relief sought must remedy the alleged pecuniary loss or tax increase. A 
declaratory judgment that the contested zone is inconsistent or an injunction 
against applying it restores the status quo ante. To the extent the plaintiff’s 
injury arose from the zoning on those parcels alone it may, thus, be 
remedied. This “solution,” however, tends to overlook that, most likely, the 
real reason for the suit is not to save money for a class of taxpayers or to 
rescue the public treasury from loss, but to require the legislative body to 
follow its own plans. The original zoning on the contested parcels may also 
be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Declaratory or injunctive 
relief merely clears away the immediate wrong, but cannot fully right it. 
What ultimately matters is what is built, and where.  
All three cases targeted specific parcels instead of challenging the 
legality of whole sectional map amendments because the standard of review 
for spot zoning is far less deferential than for comprehensive zoning. The 
heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of validity for comprehensive 
zoning makes it desirable for a landowner to seek financially advantageous 
rezoning of its property in the sectional map amendment, particularly if it 
could not survive the fact-finding scrutiny of the quasi-judicial process 
required for an individual map amendment.  
It does not follow, however, that all parts of a sectional map amendment 
are invulnerable to attack under spot zoning standards of review. In George 
F. Becker Co. v. Jerns88 the Court of Appeals found reclassification of a
parcel from a residential to an industrial zone as part of a comprehensive
rezoning was nonetheless “an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a
small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the district
is restricted, made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the owner
and not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”89
In an individual rezoning action the Howard County Board of 
Commissioners granted Becker industrial zoning over the recommendation 
of the planning commission, but implementation was suspended pending a 
suit challenging the decision. Meanwhile, the board enacted a sectional map 
amendment and again overruled the planning commission’s 
recommendation to retain residential zoning on the property. No reasons in 
the record were offered for this action beyond those stated two years earlier 
in the local map amendment case. The Court severed the parcels from the 
rest of the amendment and found the rezoning of the Becker property 
irreconcilable with the comprehensive plan and applied the tests for spot 
88. George F. Becker Co. v. Jerns, 230 Md. 541 (1963).
89. Id. at 546 (quoting Hewitt v. Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48 (1959)).
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zoning: There was no showing of a mistake in the original zoning or 
substantial change in the character of the neighborhood. The Court 
concluded:  
It is not the function of the courts to zone or rezone but only to 
determine whether the legislative body has properly applied the law 
to the facts. Nevertheless, when there is no basis for reasonable 
debate or there are no supporting facts in the record, it is proper for 
the court to declare a reclassification or rezoning to be arbitrary, 
whimsical, discriminatory or illegal (citations omitted).  
 When the record, as is the case here, is devoid of any supporting 
evidence (other than the conclusions of the board which were 
without probative value), there is no question to debate. There was 
no showing here of a basic mistake in the original zoning or a 
substantial change in the character of the neighborhood.90  
This reasoning suggests that in enacting a sectional map amendment that 
includes some parcels with zoning classifications that are inconsistent with 
the comprehensive plan exceeds legal boundaries makes those zones 
severable from the amendment and void ab initio. The Court’s application 
of the Change-Mistake Rule seems unnecessary since even if there had been 
a change or mistake, the industrial zoning was both inconsistent with the 
plan and inappropriate for the site. Once inconsistency has been established 
nothing is gained in subjecting the action to the substantive and procedural 
requirements for spot zoning. The Change-Mistake analysis in Becker and 
of the circuit court in Bilek, as well as dicta of the Court of Special Appeals 
in Harwood, seem to be a conditioned judicial reflex in zoning cases.91  
The industrial zoning in Becker clearly was inconsistent with the 
residential land use recommended by the plan. A less clear-cut case would 
require further analysis. If, for example, the plan recommended residential 
zoning but did not specify a recommended density for each parcel and the 
sectional map amendment applied a substantially denser residential zone to 
Becker’s land than to any other property. An allegation of illegal spot 
90. Jerns, 230 Md. at 547.
91. The Court of Special Appeals held that since plaintiffs challenged rezoning of a
specific parcel as spot zoning, the limited legal boundaries review of the entire
ordinance “did not preclude their more specific challenge.” Determining if illegal
spot zoning occurred required a site-specific analysis. “Faced with allegations of
spot zoning, a court reviews the challenged action for arbitrary, unreasonable, and
discriminatory action.” Harwood, 442 Md. at 609.  Therefore, the circuit court
should have reviewed plaintiff’s challenge under this standard.
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zoning should require more than an assertion the application of the 
challenged zone was an ultra vires act and beyond the legal boundary for 
comprehensive zoning. At a minimum, there should be evidence the plan 
had not contemplated the aberrant zone. And its defenders should be 
required to provide at least a scintilla of support for the proposition that the 
zone was a fairly debatable component of the plan’s residential strategy.     
A possible consequence of the consistency doctrine may be to move the 
struggle over land use from the mildly legalistic arena of zoning into the 
more overtly political arena of plan making. An owner with ambition for 
more favorable zoning of its land without enduring the individual rezoning 
process will find it prudent to focus on ensuring the land uses and zoning 
categories desired are raised as fairly debatable elements of the 
comprehensive plan before being applied by sectional map amendment. 
Once a plan has been adopted, it will be harder to challenge successfully 
zoning oddities in court if they are arguably consistent with the plan. 
Community and environmental activists can be expected to demand strong 
and precise constraints. These competing interests could provoke a shift in 
legal strategy to attack plans directly since they have attained regulatory 
status, notwithstanding the wish of the General Assembly that they should 
evade it. 
When Zoning Inconsistency Meets Subdivision Consistency 
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet spoken on the 
extent of sectional map amendment consistency with master plans under the 
SGSDA, there is a substantial line of judicial decisions on the consistency 
of subdivisions with plans when local regulations require it. Some zones 
require consistency with plans but most do not. All zones establish the 
maximum density or intensity of permitted development. Within that 
envelope, subdivision is concerned with the layout of a development and its 
relationship to other property in the area. Local subdivision regulations 
generally require consistency with master plans. Thus, if a master plan 
contains language that limits density or other dimensions of future 
development, the plan has regulatory precedence over the zone’s maxima.92 
The SGSDA provides no exemption in PFAs for the pattern of 
development. Maryland preemption doctrine would appear to allow local 
jurisdictions to continue to require consistency of subdivisions with plans.93  
92. Board of Commissioners of Cecil County v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233 (1979); Coffey
v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, 293 Md. 24
(1982); Boyds Civic Association v. Montgomery County Council, 309 Md. 683
(1987); Maryland.-National.Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Greater
Baden-Aquasco Citizens Association. 412 Md. 73 (2009); PNS Development,
LLC v. People’s Counsel, 425 Md. 436 (2011).
93. State law may preempt local law by conflict, express preemption, or implied
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Producing a consistent subdivision on a parcel with an inconsistent zone 
in a PFA has potential for metastasizing into a Catch-22. Although neither 
case above involved the SGSDA’s consistency requirements (or exemptions 
therefrom), two recent Court of Appeals decisions suggest the utility of 
careful drafting of plan language to avoid judicial deconstruction to divine 
what in the world the local land use authorities were thinking and if a 
consistent subdivision should prevail in an inconsistent zone.  
In Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. v. 
Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Association.94 the Prince George’s County 
Planning Board approved a subdivision in the county’s Rural Tier, finding 
it was “not inconsistent” with the county’s comprehensive plan for that 
area. In making its findings, the planning board did not address the 
subdivision’s relationship to the plan’s numeric growth standard for the 
area, which set a goal of capturing less than one percent of the county’s 
dwelling unit growth in the Rural Tier from the time of the general plan’s 
adoption in 2002 to 2025. The Court held that the plan imposed a binding 
obligation on the planning board to at least consider the numeric growth 
objective in determining whether to approve the subdivision:  
The Planning Board, in determining whether a preliminary 
subdivision plan conforms to the Master Plan, either must offer 
some analysis of how the preliminary subdivision plan under 
consideration may impact the long-term growth objective 
established in the General Plan or explain why such an analysis or 
conclusion is not required, as provided in § 24-121(a)(5) of the 
County Code. What the Board cannot do, however, is ignore 
entirely a patently relevant element of the Plan.95  
The Court emphasized the importance of addressing all of a plan’s 
relevant provisions in deciding whether to approve a subdivision.  
Pringle v. Montgomery County Planning Board96 took the consistency 
test a step further, focusing on the way a planning standard is phrased to 
preemption. Altadis U.S.A. v. Prince George’s County 431 Md. 307 (2013). Since 
the SGSDA explicitly promotes consistency, it would not appear to conflict with 
local consistency requirements for subdivisions. It does not explicitly preempt 
such regulations. Given the overall deference of land use law and regulation in 
Maryland to its local governments, claiming implied preemption in a field the 
state clearly does not completely occupy seems a hard case to make.  
94. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 412 Md. 73.
95. Id. at 107.
96. Pringle v. Montgomery County Planning Bd. M-NCPPC, 212 Md. App. 478
(2013).
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determine the range of discretion allowed in interpreting the plan and its 
application to a specific subdivision. Pringle appealed approval of a 
subdivision in the Germantown employment corridor, alleging it violated 
design guidelines of the 2009 sector plan97 for the area, which stated: 
“Street level retail must conform to the plan’s urban design guidance.”98  In 
addressing the specific area at issue, the plan directed that: “Big box 
retailers, if proposed, should have active storefronts with multiple entrances 
and small retail uses facing Seneca Meadows Parkway and Observation 
Drive.”99 The detailed design guidelines for street-oriented development 
provided: 
Locate buildings adjacent to the street to form a building line of the 
sidewalk and street that form public spaces. Provide front entrances 
along the street to improve pedestrian convenience, Activate the 
street, and reduce walking distances. Provide street level retail uses 
along streets where street activity is desired. Place retail, 
restaurants, and other uses at highly visible locations along 
boulevards and main streets to add vitality and convenience. Design 
retail storefronts with large, clear glass windows for merchandise 
display that promote retailing and add visual interest to the street.100 
Although the plan’s admonition that development “must conform” to its 
recommendations was binding and the layout of the subdivision’s big box 
supermarket and other retail departed from them, the Court of Special 
Appeals found the planning board had based its decision on substantial 
evidence that some of the guidelines were not feasible on the site. 
Moreover, the term should provided sufficient latitude to deviate from 
them. The court concluded:  “[W]e are persuaded that there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s findings of fact 
regarding the characteristics of the site itself and its ultimate conclusion of 
consistency with the Sector Plan.”101 The planning board had met its burden 
of justifying its decision that the subdivision was consistent with the plan.  
While neither of these cases rested on the new consistency standard of 
the SGSDA they suggest that courts take seriously consistency 
requirements. Both cases underline the need for local legislatures and 
regulatory agencies to consider and document their consideration of 
97. Id. at 480.
98. Id. at 481.
99. Id.
 100. Id. at n.3. (noting the design guidelines in regard to “Street-Oriented
Development”).
 101. Id. at 491.
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standards and guidelines enunciated in plans and that they cannot expect 
courts to accept “findings” that are not based on substantial evidence. 
Moreover, in both cases the burden of proving their action was consistent 
with plans shifted to the defendant planning boards. Assertions of 
consistency unsupported by a record of evidence-based reasons are unlikely 
to amuse a court. As Judge Harrell wrote in Acquasco-Baden:  
The Board’s conclusion that the application was ‘not inconsistent’ 
with the 2002 General Plan Development Pattern policies for the 
Rural Tier was a broad conclusory statement and not based on 
sufficient facts in the record before it. Such a half-baked conclusion 
is not entitled to deferential review.102  
A lesson to be drawn from these cases is that in crafting the language of 
plans, careful forethought should be given to how tightly to bind regulatory 
agencies charged with administering them. Foolish consistency can become 
a hobgoblin of future regulators, developers, and citizens. What must be 
done shall be done. What should be done, can be done a bit differently.  
If the reasoning of the subdivision cases is applied to a claim of violation 
of the consistency standard of the SGSDA by treatment of a particular 
parcel included in a sectional map amendment, there would be a rebuttable 
proposition that a local zoning authority exceeded its legal boundaries upon 
a showing that the zoning on a specific parcel included in the SMA was 
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The burden would then shift to 
the government to demonstrate that it considered the matter and reached its 
decision that the action was consistent with the plan based on substantial 
evidence of record. Such a finding should require more than a conclusory 
assertion by the local legislative body. It should not, however, require proof 
of change in neighborhood character or mistake in the original zoning; only 
that reasonable minds could disagree whether the zone applied was 
consistent with the plan. 
Summing Up: It Doesn’t Quite Add Up 
The most remarkable feature of Maryland’s new consistency doctrine is 
its inconsistency in the treatment of priority funding areas and land outside 
them. The exemptions for land uses and density/intensities in PFAs 
essentially leave comprehensive plans where they were before the purported 
legislative overruling of Terrapin Run. This undermines the authority of 
plans with respect to zoning but in jurisdictions that require consistency of 
 102. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 412 Md. at 109.
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subdivisions with plans, there is potential for tension in aligning consistent 
subdivisions with inconsistent zones.       
In areas outside PFAs, consistency doctrine seems at odds with the hoary 
Change-Mistake Rule. It logically would permit approval of an individual 
zoning map amendment that was consistent with the plan, even though 
there was no change in the neighborhood and deny an inconsistent 
application notwithstanding a clear showing of change or mistake. In PFAs, 
the Change-Mistake Rule will remain relevant in situations where a 
comprehensive plan is not implemented by a consistent sectional map 
amendment. If a sectional map amendment establishes a new baseline for 
measuring neighborhood change the rule is of no consequence since 
showing change would be virtually impossible. Removal of the exemptions 
and abandonment of the Change-Mistake Rule would better serve the cause 
of smart growth and effective planning.  
If the General Assembly’s approach to consistency is a bit inconsistent, 
enforcement of it through judicial review of sectional map amendments 
may require nimble allegations and liberal suspension of judicial disbelief 
for complainants to achieve taxpayer standing to serve as private attorneys 
general. If rigorously applied, it makes sectional map amendments, if not 
fully impregnable, at least hard to attack by both disappointed landowners 
and civic watchdogs. On the other hand, statutory rights of appeal and 
grants of jurisdiction for review of sectional map amendments may make 
taxpayer standing more a jurisprudential curiosity than a regulator of 
litigation.   
Finally, while consistency doctrine strengthens the role of plans in the 
management of growth and regulation of land uses, it contains an inherent 
moral and policy hazard. Elevation of plans to regulatory status produces a 
perverse incentive, even with the best of intentions, to over specify 
requirements for each parcel of land and to bind the future too tightly to the 
preferences of the moment of the plan’s adoption. Tastes in styles of living 
and working and the design and technology of development often changes 
more quickly than revision of plans. Balancing the need for direction in the 
public interest with the ability of the private producers of homes and 
business spaces to adapt to shifts in markets and tastes without first 
amending comprehensive plans will require attention to both the art and 
economics of planning. Consistency does not require exactitude. 
